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INTERNATIONAL BANKING: EFFECTS OF NATIONALIZATIONS
AND EXCHANGE CONTROLS

Noyes LEECH *

Recent litigation respectingforeign state nationalizationof bank deposits and moratoriaon bank
liabilities has centered around the act of state doctrineand the "situs" of bank obligations.The author
reports on a number of recent cases, explores the application of those doctrines and raisesquestions
about the documentation of the deposit and loan transactions.

1. Introduction
The rights and obligations of international banks have been seriously drawn
into question by recent interventions by foreign governments [1]. First, as to
obligations, is the matter of the home office's liability for deposits made in a
foreign branch. A foreign government may take over (nationalize) a depositor's
account. The takeover may be more pervasive - the branch as a whole may be
nationalized. The intervention may purport to be less permanent than a
takeover - the foreign government may impose exchange controls on the
branch, restricting immediate repayment of the deposit.
Second, as to rights, is the question of banks' ability to require payment of
loans due from a foreign borrower [2]. What is the legal effect, on the banks'
right to repayment, of exchange restrictions imposed by the foreign state?
These questions arise in very different business contexts, The home office
liability problem involves the institution of branch banking, an institution that
is not implicated in the question of the banks' rights to be repaid in the face of
debt moratoria imposed by foreign states. For lawyers, however, the problems
are interconnected because of the involvement of legal concepts and doctrines
that apply in both contexts: rules of contract law, principles of the conflict of
laws [3] and the so called act of state doctrine [4]. Unfortunately, these legal
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concepts and doctrines lack scientific precision, have been incompletely developed and are understood in differing ways by different lawyers, and no better
understood by lay people, bankers and judges. The purpose of this paper is to
describe the factual contexts in which foreign government interventions have
arisen and analyze the law's response to those cataclysmic events. This analysis
is confined to the responses offered by the laws in force in the United States
(U.S.).

2. Home Office Liability for Deposits in Branches
2.1. A Model of Home Office Liability
Let me describe what I think are the legal positions that a bank might be
expected to take on the question of home office liability for branch deposits. I
do not purport to restate the position of all U.S. banks, but rather a model of
a bank's view gleaned from a reading of court opinions [5], briefs and law
journals [6] and from conversations with bank lawyers.
(a) The bank that operates from a home office in the U.S. with branches in
foreign countries is a single legal entity. As a single entity, it is obligated
to repay deposits that are made at any of its branches, but not always.
(b) The bank bears the commercial risk of a deposit in a branch. If the
branch is unable to pay because of its failure as a business, the bank as
a whole (the home office) will repay.
(c) The bank does not bear the sovereign risk of a deposit in a branch. If
the depositor's account is nationalized by the foreign state in which the
branch is located, if the branch is nationalized, or if the foreign state
imposes a restriction on repayment (exchange control) the bank as a
whole is not obligated to repay. That is, the sovereign risk, as contrasted
with the commercial risk, must be borne by the depositor.
In the bank's view, the legal reasons for the imposition of sovereign risk on
the depositor involve some, or all, of the following propositions: first, when a
deposit is made in a foreign branch, a contract is created between the bank
and the depositor [7]; second, that contract is governed by the law of the state
where the branch is located [8]; third, if the law of that state allows the state to
take over the account, nationalize the bank or impose a restriction on
repayment, the depositor must look to whatever remedy, if any, the law of the
state provides; fourth, the law of the state where the branch is located - not
the law of the state of the home office - governs the contract because the
terms of the deposit contract provide that the contract is to be performed in
the foreign state [9].
Those terms are set by varying factual circumstances, which may include
the following: the documents, such as deposit slips, or certificates of deposit,
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may provide for payment by the branch and not by the home office. Even if
the documents do not expressly exclude home office liability, it may be within
the expectation of both parties, and thus within their contract, that home
office liability is nevertheless excluded by international banking practice. That
is, it is international banking practice to consider a branch as a separate entity
(even though not separately incorporated), and since it is a separate entity,
home office liability is excluded, a fact depositors understand. In short, home
office non-liability is an implied contract term.
There are reasons why depositors understand that home office liability is
excluded. First, depositors who are themselves international banks with
branches in foreign countries know the customs of the trade. Indeed they
benefit from the custom when they receive deposits. Second, rates of interest,
at least for U.S. banks, tend to be higher for deposits at foreign branches than
for deposits in the U.S. Two reasons are claimed for this difference in interest
rates [10]. First, foreign branches are relieved from the interest and reserve
requirements of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. They are relieved from those
requirements under the regulations of the Federal Reserve only with respect to
a deposit that is payable only at an office located outside the United States
[11]. Sophisticated depositors, at least, know this and know that this relief is
granted because home office liability is intended to be excluded when a
deposit is "payable only" at the branch. Second, interest rates are higher for
branch deposits in part because the depositor impliedly accepts the risk of
nationalization or the imposition of exchange controls.
I can find no rationale for implied exclusion of home office liability with
respect to the depositor who is not a bank or who is not a sophisticated
investor, that is, the depositor who would not know about international
banking practices or who would not be sensitive to interest rate differentials or
the reasons that might account for them. However, I do not know whether the
number of unsophisticated depositors in branch banks is significant enough to
warrant special attention to their interests in the development of international
banking law.
(d) If a bank is sued at its home by a depositor in a sovereign risk case, the
bank will defend that it has already "paid" the deposit according to the
law of the foreign state and that it does not have to pay twice [12]. It
will assert that it has either paid the deposit to the foreign state, if the
account was nationalized, or that its liability to depositors generally was
extinguished when the branch was taken over by the state. The bank
will urge the court to follow the normal rules of conflict of laws; it will
assert that the law of the state of the branch is the appropriate law,
since on the above analysis that is the law that governs the contract [13].
In turn, the depositor could claim that the forum should not give effect
to a foreign law so outrageous and repugnant as to deprive the depositor
of property without compensation or other remedy. The depositor might
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ask the court to refuse to give effect to that law because to do so would
violate the public policy of the forum. The bank's response will be that
the act of state doctrine requires the court to give effect to the foreign
law, and that it is not permitted to apply its own conceptions of public
policy [14].
(e) Continuing with the case just discussed, in which the bank is sued in the
U.S. by a depositor who seeks home office liability in a sovereign risk
case, there is the litigation risk that a court may trip itself up and tend
toward holding the home office liable. Statutory defenses are then
available, such as Section 138 of the New York Banking Law [15]. This
statute provides that a bank with a foreign branch shall be liable for
contracts and deposits to be performed and repaid at the branch, to no
greater extent than a bank of that foreign country would be liable under
its laws [16].
(f) Finally, if the contract between the depositor and the branch provides
that the home office will repay the deposit despite what happens in the
foreign state, the bank will admit that the home office is liable 1171. But
this is a very large "if". The existence of such a contract is not lightly to
be conceded.
In attributing these propositions to a hypothetical bank, I have tried not to
over-generalize their acceptability. Some banks may disagree with them. Also,
by attributing them to a bank, I have not intended to say that they are not
valid in law or that I reject any of them. I have one question - whether as a
matter of policy, if not of current law, the home office should always be free of
liability when the branch itself is nationalized [18].
2.2. The Act of State Doctrine [19]
Because it figures so prominently in the nationalization cases discussed in
Section 2.3, an analysis of the act of state doctrine is in order. In the U.S., it is
made by the courts [20] and the effect of which is to compel the application of
foreign law in certain cases. In one sense it is the functional equivalent of the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity [21]. Two cases will illustrate this
equivalence. If a foreign state expropriates property, it might be sued in a U.S.
court by the former owner who claims, for instance, that the taking violated
international law because it was not for a public purpose, was discriminatory
against aliens, or was not accompanied by compensation. United States courts
will not entertain that suit if the foreign state pleads sovereign immunity [22].
The taking will not be examined because the court will not get to the merits.
In contrast, posit the case in which the expropriated property was transferred
by the foreign state to a private person who is subject to the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts. In a suit by the former owner against the new owner, based on a
claim that the foreign state violated international law, a defense of foreign

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol8/iss2/1

N. Leech / Internationalbanking

sovereign immunity is simply not available to the private defendant. Only a
foreign state is given immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the U.S.
If the court were able to get to the merits, it would be necessary to subject the
act of the foreign state to examination. However, under the act of state
doctrine, the court is obliged not to make that examination [23). The result is
dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. The doctrine does the service, in the suit
between the private parties, that the rule of foreign sovereign immunity would
perform when the state is defending.
That the former owner cannot recover in our courts would not necessarily
mean that the owner is without remedy, but the remedy must be sought in the
foreign state itself or at the diplomatic level in the U.S. If the former owner is
able to persuade the State Department to take up the claim against the foreign
state, the Department would seek redress on the owner's behalf through
negotiation with the foreign state, leading possibly to settlement, arbitration
or, remotely, to a proceeding in the International Court of Justice on the
ground that the foreign state has violated international law when it took the
property of a U.S. citizen without compensation.
In the well-known case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino [24], the
U.S. Supreme Court explained the doctrine as a principle whose "continuing
vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters
bearing upon foreign affairs" [25]. The act of state doctrine seems only to
reiterate the normal rules of conflict of laws: if a foreign state performs an act
in a matter as to which it has jurisdiction, our courts normally recognize that
act [26]. However, our courts have not always routinely applied foreign law
[27]. In New York, an exception to the normal application of foreign law is
recognized where a law is found to offend the public policy of the forum [281.
Typical of such public policy has been the policy of refusing to give effect to a
nationalization that does not provide compensation to the owner of expropriated property [29]. The act of state doctrine operates to nullify that exception.
Despite the locally recognized public policy, the court's abstention on act of
state grounds results in the application of the usual conflicts rule. As narrowly
stated by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino: "... the Judicial Branch will not
examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a
foreign sovereign government ... " [301.
I will pass over lightly the developing expressions of dissatisfaction with the
act of state doctrine. The story involves the enactment of the Hickenlooper
Amendment that changed the result in the Sabbatino case [31]; the amendment's narrow interpretation in subsequent litigation [32]; and the recognition
of other exceptions to the doctrine by at least some members of the Supreme
Court (the "Bernstein exception") [33].
But there is one aspect of the doctrine of particular relevance in bank
deposit cases. It need not be called an exception, since the Supreme Court's
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statement of the rule contained this limitation: the courts are not to examine
the validity of a taking of property within the foreign state's own territory [34].
The problem with a bank deposit is that it is not a physical object within a
foreign state's territory. In Republic of Iraq o.First National City Bank [35],
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the Sabbatino opinion
as affirmatively allowing examination of the validity of a foreign state's taking,
if the property in question is "within the United States at the time of the
attempted confiscation [36]". The court held that a New York bank account
owned by the estate of the late King of Iraq was not within Iraq at the time
the government of Iraq purported to confiscate it, but was within New York
[37]. Therefore the act of state doctrine did not apply and the court could use
customary conflict of laws analysis [38]. Under this analysis, the court conceded that Iraq had jurisdiction, based upon the citizenship of King Faisal, to
make a declaration about the ownership of his bank deposit, and to shift that
ownership to itself [39]. But since Iraq purported to take the King's property
without compensation, the U.S. court could decide not to give effect to Iraq's
action [40].
Why should the act of state doctrine preclude examination of a taking of
property within the taking state and allow examination when the property is
outside the taking state? The reason cannot be that the taking state does not
have "jurisdiction" under international law to make legal declarations about
ownership of property outside its territory. It has jurisdiction to declare that,
as far as its law is concerned, a chattel in New York is no longer owned by one
of its citizens, but is owned by itself [41]. If compensation were paid, our
courts would most probably not question that legal declaration [42].
Perhaps the explanation for this differential application of the act of state
doctrine is simply that the Supreme Court stated the rule narrowly to cover
only the facts of Sabbatino. Lower courts, not caring for a rule that stands in
the way of "doing justice" in the individual case, therefore feel free not to
apply it when the property is not within the taking state [43]. Perhaps the
explanation is that some bases of jurisdiction, such as property within the
state, owned by a citizen, seem to be more reasonable than others, such as
property located outside the state but owned by a citizen. When faced with
this dilemma in bank deposit cases, when the property cannot be seen to be
anywhere, some courts do not analyze this differential application of the
doctrine but accept the proposition as given: for the act of state doctrine to
apply, the deposit account must be given a location, a situs [44]. Once a situs is
found, one knows how to apply the doctrine. The trouble with reasoning on
the basis of situs, however, is that once a situs is determined, the conclusion
has been stated. If situs is determined by a court, and thus is determinative of
the result without an analysis of the reasons for differential application of the
act of state doctrine, the court's opinion arguably lacks substance.
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2.3. The Home Office in the Courts - Perez, Garciaand Vishipco
A model of the legal positions a bank might take on the question of home
office liability is outlined in Section 2.1. I do not think a review of several
recent cases posing this question indicates that the propositions I have
outlined have been rejected. But the facts in litigated cases are usually not
clear and the opinions frequently carry uncertain implications.
Both Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank [45], decided by the New York Court
of Appeals and Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank [46], decided by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, involve certificates of deposit issued
in Cuba by a branch of Chase Manhattan Bank. In both cases the accounts of
the depositors were nationalized and the banks paid over the deposits to the
Cuban government. Only after these payments were made, the branches as
such were nationalized. When the bank was sued in New York for payment of
the deposits, opposite results were reached [47]. I do not say inconsistent
results, however, since the facts as found by the courts arguably make for the
difference in result.
In Perez, certificates of deposit were purchased with local currency [481. No
place of payment was specified in the certificates although they stated that
payment would be made in "moneda nacional" [49]. After the Castro government came into power, new Cuban law permitted the government to order
banks to close certain accounts of former officials of the Batista government
and to turn the proceeds over to the government [50]. The New York court
held that Chase's debt was satisfied by payment to the Cuban government
[51]. The jury had found that the debt was repayable in dollars and that the
certificates could have been presented at any Chase bank anywhere in the
world, including New York and Cuba [52].
The fact that payment was possible in places other than Cuba led to
disagreement among the New York courts over application of the act of state
doctrine as the Perez case moved up from trial to final appellate ruling. The
trial court dealt with the problem as one of situs of the debt [53]. The situs was
in Cuba and therefore the act of state doctrine required the Cuban taking to
stand [54]: "[iln order for this debt to be beyond Cuban jurisdiction in this
case, it would have been necessary for the jury to have found that the place of
presentment was only outside of Cuba" [55]. The next highest court disagreed:
the act of state doctrine applies only "where the obligation is found to be
situated exclusively within the foreign State" [56]. The highest appeal court
disagreed with that ruling: "... a debt is located within a foreign State when
that State has the power to enforce or collect it" [57]. This required giving
effect to the Cuban decree, even though, as the court said, the debt had
"multiple situs" [58].
I think the Court of Appeals in Perez reached the right result for convincing reasons which do not require playing games with the abstract concept of
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situs. There was certainly a reasonable basis, in conflict of laws terms, for
Cubas exercise of power over Chase to require Chase to pay the debt. Chase
was there; the deposit had been made there; the depositors were Cubans; the
account was opened in Cuban money [59]. The question is whether, given
those facts, a U.S. court should be permitted to apply its own notions of
public policy to overried Cuban laws. The underpinnings of the act of state
doctrine are that U.S. courts should not intrude on the functions of the
executive branch in conducting foreign relations and with maintaining "relations with the foreign state. Too aggressive judicial intrusion into matters
touching foreign relations is to be avoided. It is too aggressive when the
foreign state has power to change legal relations effectively within its borders the state can effectively act with respect to things within its borders and bank
accounts within its borders. A court is intruding in foreign affairs when it
characterizes such an effective act as unlawful. In that case, the act of state
doctrine should be applied and the payment by the bank given effect to
extinguish the debt under the applicable law.
Despite this analysis, it is intriguing that, arguably, the same result would
be reached even if the act of state doctrine were not applied. The argument
might proceed along these lines. When the depositor sues to compel payment
in the U.S., the bank counters by stating that Cuban law governs the deposit
under ordinary conflicts principles. The depositor argues that when a taking is
without compensation the court should not apply the ordinary conflicts rule
but should look to the public policy of the forum, under which an uncompensated taking is repugnant; therefore the court should not give effect to the
Cuban law. The bank's response might reasonably be that, if the public policy
of the forum is applied in that way, and the Cuban taking is not given effect,
an equally repugnant result will occur: the bank will be obliged to pay twice.
For the court to make the bank pay twice is just as bad as not letting the
depositor recover once. Therefore, as between the depositor and the bank,
public policy analysis results in a draw. Thus, since public policy analysis
leads nowhere, the ordinary conflicts rule should apply.
While Perez was decided on an analysis of the act of state doctrine, the
Garcia [60] case interpreted the circumstances under which the deposits were
made in such a way as to make that doctrine irrelevant, without repudiating its
applicability. The court gave full credit to Cuba's taking within Cuba, but
found Chase liable to pay the debt a second time because, in effect, it had
made an additional contract with the depositors [61]. Chase was found to be
an insurer against the depositor's claim nationalized by Cuba [62]. In Garcia,
Chase again issued certificates of deposit against local currency [63]. Under
the same Cuban law that was applied in Perez, Chase was directed to freeze
the depositors' account and turn over its value to the Castro government [64].
Chase did so. When the surviving depositor sued Chase in the U.S. federal
court, the trial court's judgment for the depositor was affirmed by the Court of
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Appeals [65]. Although conceding that the certificates were payable at any of
Chase's branches world-wide, the bank argued that its payment to Cuba
cancelled the debt and that the act of state doctrine precluded examination of
the Cuban government's action in demanding and receiving payment [66].
Why was there a different result than in Perez? The court's likening of the
act of the Cuban government to armed robbery was hardly responsive to the
legal issue presented in the case [67]. On the legal issues, the court conceded
that if the situs of Chase's debt were in Cuba, Cuba could validly seize it and
the act of state doctrine would prevent examination of that seizure [68]. I take
that to mean the court would have been precluded from inquiring into whether
Cuba was acting as an armed robber. But the court found more to the case
than the question of the situs of Cuba's debt. The court found that the bank
had agreed that, even if Cuba seized the deposits, it would still pay the
depositors [69]; the bank had "accepted the risk that it would be liable
elsewhere for obligations incurred by its branch" [70].
The evidence, according to the court was:
Dominguez and Garcia became concerned for the safety of their money in 1958 in
light of the ongoing Cuban revolution. At the recommendation of a friend, they
visited Chases Vedado branch on March 10, 1958 and spoke to two bank officers.
Dominguez expressed his fears over the safety of his money and stated that he
wanted to make a fixed term deposit of 100,000 pesos. The Chase officials
responded that he was doing the right thing "because it was an insurance, security
for the money". They explained that the deposit was a "private contract" between
the bank and Dominguez and Garcia. They stated that Chases main office in New
York would guarantee the certificate and that they could be repaid by presenting
the certificate at any Chase branch world-wide. The officials said that repayment
could be made in dollars in New York since "that is the money that the bank used"

1711.
The court rested its holding for the depositors on "Chase's contractual
undertaking to ensure the safety of [the depositors'] money by agreeing to
honor its obligations in dollars at any of its branches" [72]. There was
disagreement with the dissenting judge on the jury's findings, as to whether the
bank officers really did promise that the home office would insure the
depositors against seizure of their accounts by the Cuban government [73]. I
think the lesson is not one that concerns the act of state doctrine, or even how
to solve the riddle of the situs of debts, but rather one of loose talk by bank
officials and sloppy documentation of the deposit.
When one thinks of the nature of the contract that the bank was found to
have made, it is most remarkable. The branch was still open; its assets were
there; the bank was there. It would be possible as a matter of fact for Cuba to
single out depositors and demand their deposits from the bank. The bank
would have no defense whatsoever under Cuban law. Nevertheless, the bank
officers guaranteed that if that happened, the bank would pay twice. Would
they have promised that, if the depositors collected their money and Cuba
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expropriated that money the next day, the bank would pay the depositors
again? The branch officers were able to get the deposits made. Was that
considered a payment for the remarkable insurance policy? Two things are
possible. The officers never issued such an insurance policy, or the officers did
not realize what they were doing. In the latter case, the message to higher
officials in the bank is clear enough. One wonders what internal precautions,
in terms of employee training and loan documentation, home offices are
taking in light of this unusual case.
Perez and Garcia involved the taking of individual depositors' accounts.
Only after those events occurred were the branches nationalized; the subsequent nationalizations were irrelevant to the issues presented in those two
cases. In Vishipco Line v. Chase ManhattanBank [74], a more difficult problem
is encountered - what are the home office liabilities if the branch as such is
seized?
In Vishipco, the plaintiffs were Vietnamese corporations and a Vietnamese
citizen that had deposited funds in the Saigon branch of Chase Manhattan
Bank [75]. Chase closed its Saigon branch when it appeared to Chase's
officials in New York that Saigon would be taken over by the communists
761. A week later, the new government issued a communiqu6 which specified
that "banks ... will be confiscated and ... managed by the revolutionary
administration" 771. The French embassy, to whom the local Chase officials
had delivered the branch's financial records, turned those records over to the
new government [78]. Suit was brought against Chase in New York for the
bank's failure to repay the deposits [79]. Chase's defenses included: (1) the
seizure of the branch relieved Chase of liability for the deposits under the
doctrines of impossibility [80] and force majeure [81]; (2) the obligations of the
Saigon branch with respect to the individual claims had been assumed by the
new government and the act of state doctrine should be applied to prevent
challenge to such an act of the government [82]; and (3) Section 138 of the
New York Banking Law [83] limited bank liability for overseas branch
deposits [84].
With respect to the defense of impossibility, the court observed that: "[b]y
operating in Saigon through a branch rather than through a separate corporate
entity, Chase accepted the risk that it would be liable elsewhere for obligations
incurred by its branch" [85]. The court's position was that a unitary corporation is liable for obligations incurred by any of its divisions. The court asserted
that a different result might (not would) have been reached if the Saigon
branch had been a locally incorporated subsidiary or "if the deposit contract
had included an explicit waiver on the part of the depositor of any right to
proceed against the home office" [86].
We have seen earlier that, in defining its contract obligations, a bank may
seek to draw a distinction between the commercial risk of a branch's failure
and the sovereign risk of government interference with a bank [87]. No such
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distinction was made by the court nor did it make a specific inquiry into the
expectations of these particular depositors. The court concluded that Chase
had accepted the risk it would have to pay at the home office because "U.S.
banks, by operating abroad through branches rather than through subsidiaries,
reassure foreign depositors that their deposits will be safer with them than
they would be in a locally incorporated bank" [88]. The court asserted that
South Vietnamese policy permitting foreign banks to operate only through
branches was intended to give depositors more protection than if they had
made their deposits in locally incorporated subsidiaries [89].
Let me emphasize that these are statements about depositors' understandings in general, neither amplified in the court's opinion nor made with
reference to the particular facts surrounding the plaintiffs' transactions with
the branch. That is, the court did not detail conversations with bank officers
such as those that took place in Garcia. The interest rates on these deposits
and differentials with interest rates in locally incorporated branches or in
other markets were not explored - Chase's obligation to pay elsewhere than in
Saigon was largely assumed.
With respect to the application of the act of state doctrine, the court's
response was that the government's decree did not purport to seize the
deposits and, in any event, the deposits no longer had their situs in Vietnam
when Chase closed its doors [90]. The court noted that on the closing of a
branch, "the situs of the debt represented by the deposit would spring back
and cling to the home office" [91]. Since Chase was no longer in Vietnam, the
government could not sue the bank there to enforce the debt and no longer
had jurisdiction over the debt. Thus, even if the government had purported to
seize the deposits, it would not have been acting with respect to property
within its territory and the act of state doctrine would not apply [92].
I have difficulty accepting that proposition. Although the idea of debt
springing back to New York and clinging to the home office is colorful, it is
another abstract manipulation of the situs concept that contains within itself
the conclusion to the question that is being asked - whether the home office is
liable for deposits in branches in a sovereign risk case. This criticism may be
countered by the argument that Vishipco was not a sovereign risk case because
the branch was not open when Saigon was overrun and the nationalization
decree issued [931. But the court apparently viewed Chase a having voluntarily
closed the branch without giving notice to the depositors or providing for their
payment elsewhere. That line of reasoning might lead to the conclusion that,
when a branch is nationalized, the home office will be liable if it can anticipate
that the nationalization will occur and voluntarily fails to provide for payment
of the branch's depositors before the event. I am not at all sure that the court
would be willing to go so far, but the result, at least, would not depend upon
the artificiality of the shifting situs of the debt [94].
The Vishipco case may be unique because its facts were unique. The branch
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had closed its doors; the court concluded that Chase was no longer in
Vietnam. That fact led to nonapplication of the act of state doctrine [95]. But
what does the case portend for nationalizations that take the legal form of
state succession to a branch that is still operating? If the government formally
assumes the branch's deposit obligations and is prepared to honor them, I
assume there will be little occasion for litigation. If the nationalization
formally takes the depositors' claims as well as the bank's assets, the analysis
of the depositors' claims should proceed on the same basis as discussed in
connection with Perez [96].
A different problem is presented, however, if the nationalization process
formally repudiates liability on the deposit claims, if the nationalized bank
determines not to pay them, or if the depositor prefers to be paid in dollars at
the home office rather than in local currency at the nationalized bank.
Analytically the case differs from the nationalization of depositors' claims as
such. The nationalization is aimed at the bank. The policy question is who
should bear the risk of that nationalization? It seems to me that an analysis of
the contract is unavoidable to answer that question. In the Vishipco case, the
courts' analysis was based on general statements about what depositors expect
when making deposits in an overseas branch. At the outset of this article, I
indicated various ways in which the depositors' expectations could be explored: the understandings of knowledgeable and sophisticated depositors
about international banking practices and the language of deposit documents.
I further indicated that the expectations of unsophisticated depositors simply
cannot be supplied by generalizations. The risks in litigation are too great for
the banks to leave deposit contracts so unclear. There are risks that courts will
find implied terms, will generalize about expectations and will manipulate the
concept of situs to reach results the parties would not have bargained for had
they negotiated and clarified the deal. If the terms of the deal are left open, it
is tempting to the court that the bank may be the "deeper pocket". If the
terms of the contract are left open, there may be no factual basis for deciding
which party, by contract, has accepted the risk of nationalization. The court
may then reasonably inquire, "Who is the better risk bearer?"
The bank does not want to pay the depositor twice, once by losing its assets
to the nationalizing state and once by being required to pay at the home office.
On the other hand, the depositor does not want never to be paid. However,
the bank has one remedy that may not be available to the depositor or that
may not be effective for depositors of diverse nationalities. It is the ability to
seek the aid of the depositor's home state to espouse an international claim for
assets is has been required to give up without compensation, a remedy that is
not available to depositors who are citizens of the nationalizing state. I suggest
this remedy with considerable diffidence because of the uncertainty of the
rules of international law, the absence of forums with power to recognize and
enforce claims under international law and the political nature of the negotiat-
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ing process between states. Nevertheless, the bank, making its claim through
the auspices of a single state, is far more likely to recover the losses from
nationalization than are a large number of depositors. The depositor's claims
will be smaller than the bank's. If the depositors are of diverse nationalities.
their claims may be fragmented. In short, they may fall through the cracks of
the administration of international claims. It strikes me that the possibility of
such an eventual remedy for the bank under international claims law is an
appropriate consideration in the development of a policy for the allocation of
risk in nationalization cases.
2.4. Exchange Control Laws: The Wells Fargo Case
Wells FargoAsia Limited v. Citibank [97], is in litigation in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. It does not involve a nationalization, nor does it involve a double payment or risk of double payment by the
home office. The issue is whether the home office is obligated to immediately
repay a deposit which is the subject of a foreign state's exchange control
regulations delaying payment by the branch [98].
Wells Fargo Asia Limited (Wells Fargo) is chartered in Singapore and a
wholly owned subsidiary of a federally chartered U.S. bank [99]. It claims as
follows. Through a money broker, it placed two $1,000,000 deposits with
Citibank's Manila branch [100]. The confirmations for these transactions
provide for payment of the deposits in New York [101]. Before maturity of the
deposits, the Philippines Central Bank promulgated a regulation requiring
Central Bank approval for any remittance of foreign exchange for repayment
of principal to foreign banks and financial institutions [102]. Thereafter,
Citibank secured approval for payment of a portion of the deposits with funds
previously deposited by Citibank/Manila in banks outside the Philippines
[103]. Citibank refused to pay the balance, citing the Philippine exchange
control regulation as the basis for nonpayment [104]. Wells Fargo sued
Citibank for the balance and moved for summary judgment [105]. The district
court denied summary judgment because of "factual disputes which may have
a material bearing on Citibank's liability" [106].
The parties divide on several questions. One is the interpretation of the
documents establishing the deposit. Citibank/Manila's initial telex states:
Please remit U.S. DLR 1.000.000.00 to our account with Citibank New York. At
maturity we remit U.S. DLR 1,050,277.78 to your account with Wells Fargo Bank
Intl. Corp. N.Y. through Citibank New York [1071.

Wells Fargo's confirmation states:
We shall instruct Wells Fargo Bk Intl New York to pay to Citibank, N.A. 399 Park
Avenue. New York, N.Y. 10022 U.S.A. Please pay to our A/C with Wells Fargo Bk
Intl New York [1081.
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The broker's confirmation states:
Settlement-Citibank N.A. NYK AC Manila Repayment-Wells-Fargo Bk Intl, NYK
AC Wells Fargo Asia Ltd SGP No. 003-023645 [109].

A statement of Citibank's Terms and Conditions, which the district court
states was "apparently" sent to Wells Fargo after the deposits were placed
provides:
The bank shall have no responsibility for or liability to the unsigned for ... the
unavailability of such funds due to restrictions on convertibility, requisitions,
involuntary transfers, distraints of any character ... or other similar causes beyond
the bank's control [110].

Wells Fargo claims that a branch deposit is a deposit liability of the bank as a
whole, that confirmations by the parties and the broker clarify this by making
the deposits payable in New York, that the exchange control regulation in
question prevents payment only with Philippine assets and that it does not
purport to prevent Citibank from paying with its own assets outside the
Philippines [111].
Citibank takes the position that the transaction can be understood only in
the light of banking industry practices in connection with Eurodollar deposits
[112]. According to Citibank's description of Eurodollar practices, these confirmations do not represent a commitment by the home office to stand behind
the deposits in the branch [113], nor do they make the account "payable in
New York", implying liability of the home office [114]. As stated by counsel
for Citibank in oral argument, they "reflect nothing but the common practice
in the industry, which is to reflect places where remittances may be sent"
[115].
Citibank further asserts that, according to industry practices, in a sovereign
risk case, as opposed to a credit risk case, the depositor knows that the liability
is only that of the branch where the account is payable [116]. Citibank claims
that Wells Fargo knew this to be the understanding in the banking community
[117]. It argued that Wells Fargo made the deposit in the Philippines to get a
higher rate of interest (10%) than would have been possible if the deposit had
been made with Citibank in New York (8.85%) [118].
Wells Fargo countered by denying that the differential was caused by its
assumption of an increased sovereign risk [119]. It asserted that the branch
was able to pay a higher rate of interest solely because the U.S. reserve and
deposit insurance requirements are not imposed on deposits outside the U.S.
[120].
In its denial of summary judgment, the court noted the difference between
non-negotiable deposits, such as the one in question, and negotiable certificates of deposit [121], which normally expressly limit the holder to rights
under the law of the state where the branch is located [122. The Wells Fargo
deposits were not expressly made subject to Philippine legal restraints [123].
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The court found the documentation unclear and thus sent the disputes of the
parties to trial on the merits [124]. Central questions to be determined by trial
are: (1) what is the understanding of the banking industry with respect to
Eurodollar deposit confirmations, (2) what is the understanding of banks with
respect to assumption of sovereign risks, and (3) did Wells Fargo have those
understandings when it made these deposits [125]? The fact that interest rates
for branch deposits were different from the rates for home office deposits may
be relevant to determining Wells Fargo's understanding of the terms of the
contract. However, the significance of this fact has been expressly reserved for
the trier of fact by the district court [126].
If one looks to the future, here again is a case where the terms of the
contract have been left to implications and industry practice, with documentation that is not explicit to the layperson, which includes non-banking lawyers
and judges. It may be that the actors in this type of transaction are all so
sophisticated and knowledgeable that clearer documentation is not needed.
Citibank affidavits state this is the case; that may be proved at trial [127]. If,
however, understandings are less than universal, the banking community must
deal with the resulting problems. Can explicit documentation be developed for
a market that depends upon rapidly moving electronic communications? What
costs would be imposed upon the industry if it is required to forego reliance on
practice in favor of more explicit documentation?
1S. Section 138 of the New York Banking Law
A court's analysis of a nationalization case might lead it toward home office
liability in the following situations: (1) the home office is liable if it promised
to pay even though the depositor's account is seized (Garcia); (2) the home
office is liable if the branch closes and its assets are seized (Vishipco); (3) the
court concludes that the sovereign risk should fall on the home office in a
branch nationalization case, a conclusion I speculate a court might reach
where the contract is not clear and the depositor is unsophisticated; and (4)
the branch fails (a credit risk case). Section 138 provides that a bank located in
New York with a branch office in a foreign country shall be liable for branch
deposits to be repaid at the branch to no greater extent than a bank of that
country would be liable under that country's law [128].
Until recently, Section 138 was not applied to nationalization cases because
the defendant banks have been national banks and the statute was amended
only recently to apply expressly to national banks [129]. The open questions
are whether the amendment merely clarifies an original legislative intention to
apply the statute to national banks, whether the section should be applied
retroactively and, as raised in Wells Fargo, whether the New York state
legislature can constitutionally apply this legislation to national banks [130].
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As I read the section, whatever the ultimate decision on its application to
national banks, it may have only a limited applicability, depending upon how
the court arrives at the possibility of home office liability. The section deals
with deposits to be repaidat the branch office [131]. In a case such as Garcia,
where the court adds a contract to the basic deposit contract, it is arguable
that the New York statute is not applicable according to its terms. Under this
line of analysis, Section 138 would not apply in any case where the court finds
that the contract calls for payment elsewhere than at the branch, no matter
what happens in the country of the branch. It similarly might not be applicable in any case in which the court finds that the situs of the deposit has
"sprung back" to New York, since the deposit is arguably no longer "to be
repaid" at the branch. Under its terms, the section would not relieve the home
office of liability for commercial failure of the branch, since the branch would
presumably not be relieved of liability, in the country where it is located, by
that country's laws.
This analysis leaves only the following case: where the contract calls for
payment only at the branch and either the depositors' accounts are nationalized or the branch is nationalized. Recall that in Perez, in which accounts were
nationalized, the act of state doctrine was applied and the home office was
liable to no greater extent than a bank of Cuba would have been liable under
Cuba's laws, which is what Section 138 calls for [132]. If the same act of state
reasoning is applied in a branch nationalization case, a similar result would
obtain. Thus, it appears that the New York statute is a local, nonfederal
application of the act of state doctrine. As such, in the limited case I have
outlined, it does not produce a radical result [133].
3. Sovereign Liability for Bank Loans: Moratoria
Allied Bank Internationalv. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago [134] puts
the question: what, if any, legal effect must a U.S. court give to a foreign
government's decision to delay payment of its bank debt?
Costa Rican banks, owned by the government and subject to the control of
its Central Bank, borrowed from a syndicate for which Allied Bank International (Allied) is the agent. Promissory notes and side agreements promised
payment of U.S. dollars in New York City [135]. No governing law was
specified in the contract; jurisdiction over disputes was provided for in New
York and Costa Rica [136]. Although some installment payments were made
[137], payments were suspended in the face of an economic crisis. A presidential decree permitted payment of external debt only with approval of the Costa
Rican Central Bank [138]. The cited reason was that "... presently the
Government of Costa Rica is renegotiating its External Debt and for this
purpose there should be harmony of decisions and centralization in the
decision-making process" [139]. When informed by the Central Bank that
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payment of external debt in U.S. dollars was deferred, Allied sued for
payment [140].
The trial court found for the defendants on the basis of the act of state
doctrine [141], so that the Costa Rican government's deferral of payment of
the debt was not subject to question [142]. Pending appeal, a refinancing
agreement was signed by all parties except one American creditor bank, whose
interests Allied represented on appeal [143]. The Court of Appeals affirmed
[144], but on a different legal basis. Allied had argued that the act of state
doctrine did not apply because the situs of the debt was in New York. The
court stated that whether the situs was in New York or in Costa Rica was not
determinative [145]. If the situs was Costa Rica, Allied's claim should be
dismissed on the basis of act of state [146]. Even if the situs was New York
and the act of state doctrine would not apply, the claim should still be
dismissed [147] because "our courts will give effect to those actions 'only if
they are consistent with the policy and law of the United States' " [148]. The
Court then found the debt deferral acts of the Costa Rican government to be
consistent with the law and policy of the U.S. for several reasons [149]. First,
as to law, an 1883 U.S. Supreme Court case [150] had given effect to the
Canadian government's reorganization of a government-owned railway [151].
In addition, the U.S. Bankruptcy Act [152] allows for reorganization of
corporations [153]. The Costa Rican deferral process was consistent with what
U.S. law allows [154]. Second, as to policy, the court noted that the President
and the Congress had reacted sympathetically to the Costa Rican government's
financial crisis [155]. For example, the U.S. had joined in a recommendation
that Costa Rica's commercial debt be rescheduled [156]. Thus, unlike the Iraq
case, in which the act of a foreign state purporting to deal with property
within the U.S. was not given effect because it violated deepseated notions of
public policy [157], the court gave effect to the Costa Rican act because it was
consistent with this policy [158].
On rehearing, the court vacated its prior decision because it determined that
its previous interpretation of United States policy was wrong [159]. The U.S.,
which entered the case as amicus curiae [160], explained that although U.S.
policy was indeed to encourage restructuring of foreign debt, Costa Rica's
unilateral restructuring was inconsistent with the cooperation and negotiation
favored by the U.S. [161]. "The entire strategy is grounded in the understanding that, while parties may agree to renegotiate conditions of payment, the
underlying obligations to pay nevertheless remain valid and enforceable"
[162].
Because in its earlier opinion the result was to give effect to Costa Rican
law whether or not the act of state doctrine applied, the court's revised
position on U.S. policy required it to make a determination as to whether the
doctrine applied or not [163]. It held that it did not apply, because the situs of
the property was in the U.S., not Costa Rica, under two lines of analysis [164].
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First, as the Second Circuit reasoned:
[The] concept of the situs of a debt for act of state purposes differs from the
ordinary concept. It depends in large part on whether the purported taking can be
said to have 'come to complete fruition within the dominion of the [foreign]
government'. ... In this case, Costa Rica could not wholly extinguish the Costa
Rican banks' obligation to timely pay United States dollars to Allied in New York

[165].
This is an odd way to put the matter since the whole point of the case was to
ask whether Costa Rica could wholly extinguish the Costa Rican banks'
obligation. I take it the court is most likely saying that, as a sheer matter of
power, Costa Rica acting within its own territory had no ability to keep a U.S.
court from rendering a judgment which could be collected by the creditors
from assets outside Costa Rica. Indeed, in an earlier part of the opinion, the
court had noted that it would "affront" the foreign government to hold that a
taking was a nullity if it is "wholly accomplished" within the foreign state's
territory. In terms of power in fact, a state can never wholly accomplish the
extinction of an obligation of a bank whose person and assets may be at some
time in the future subject to another state's jurisdiction.
The court's second line of analysis - the "ordinary situs analysis" - placed
the situs in New York [166]. The court balanced the interests of the two
countries, a feature of modem conflicts analysis in the U.S., reciting the two
countries' connections with the transaction. New York's interest was described
in detail: jurisdiction had been conceded in New York, the Costa Rican banks
had agreed to pay in dollars, the syndicate agent was in New York, some
negotiations had taken place in the U.S., and the U.S. has an interest in
maintaining New York as
[One of the foremost financial centers in the world [and in] ensuring that creditors
entitled to payment in the United States in United States dollars under contracts
subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts may assume that, except under the
most extraordinary circumstances, their rights will be determined in accordance
with recognized principles of contract law [167].

Costa Rica's interest was described as "essentially limited to the extent to
which it can alter the payment terms" of the contracts, the court noting Costa
Rica's "legitimate concern in overseeing the debt situation of state-owned
banks and in maintaining a stable economy" [168].
Having stated these opposing interests the court did not weigh them in any
way that is observable from its opinion other than to conclude rather opaquely
that Costa Rica's "potential jurisdiction over the debt is not sufficient to
locate the debt there for the purposes of act of state doctrine analysis" [169].
What that potential jurisdiction might be is not described.
The court's analysis of the situs of the debts is less than satisfactory. It
reached its conclusion on one line of analysis without articulating clearly that
Costa Rica lacked power in fact to alter the outcome and on the other line of
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analysis by an ostensible interest balancing which did not weigh the interests.
However, the court's explanation of why the act of state doctrine does not
apply to acts of foreign states purporting to affect property outside the state
[1701 is more persuasive than its situs analysis. It reiterated the Supreme
Court's rationale for the doctrine as designed to preclude judicial interference
in the executive's conduct of foreign relations [171]. It asserted that a court
should not inquire into the act of a foreign state "[ijf [the] adjudication would
embarrass or hinder the executive in the realm of foreign relations" [172]. It
hinted that foreign state acts could be examined if they involved commercial
matters [173] and it asserted that if a "taking is wholly accomplished within
the foreign state's territory, [that] would be an affront to [the] foreign
government" [1741. This permitted the leap to the conclusion that the situs of
the property was controlling and its twofold analysis of situs described above
[175].
Finally, having disposed of the act of state doctrine, the court returned to
the question whether the Costa Rican deferrals were nevertheless to be given
effect and concluded they should not [176]. They were not consistent with U.S.
law and policy: they were "inconsistent with the orderly resolution of international debt problems" [177]; they were contrary to the interests of the U.S. as
a major source of international credit [178]; they were "counter to principles
of contract law" [179]. The Costa Rican banks must pay their debt despite
their government's moratorium.
4. Conclusion
Doctrines relating to situs of debt and act of state are particularly troubling
in cases involving intangibles such as deposits and other bank debt. Those
doctrines are litigation tools. Because of their uncertain content and application, litigation may lead to results the parties would not have contemplated
had transactions been fully negotiated and their terms clarified. Many of the
problems encountered in the litigation discussion in this article could have
been avoided if documentation had more explicitly spelled out the expectations of the parties. The uncertainties of the search for those expectations in
commercial practices and understandings would have been avoided. I leave my
consideration of the cases with a question: is there anything about the banking
industry that makes it impossible or impracticable for these understandings to
be identified and then expressed clearly?

Notes
1] Such interventions are illustrated by the circumstances underlying the cases discussed in
this paper. See infra text accompanying notes 45-47, 75-77 and 97-103.
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[2]A foreign borrower may be either a private borrower, a bank owned by a foreign state, or a
foreign state itself.
[3] The relevant conflicts rules are those concerning choice of law. See infra note 26 and
accompanying text.
[4] See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
[5]See, e.g., Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Wells
Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, No. 84 Civ. 0996 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1984).
[6] See, e.g., Dufey & Giddy, Eurocurrency Deposit Risk, 8 J. Banking & Fin. 567 (1984);
Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, 11 Law & Pol.
Int'l Bus. 903 (1979); Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible:A Comment on Shaffer t. Heitner, 53
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 102 (1978).
[7] See Garcia, 735 F.2d at 646 (bank officials characterized Cuban customer's deposit as a
"private contract" with the bank).
[8] See Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 473, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (application of Cuban
law to the bank's obligation where the situs of the debt was Cuba).
[9] See also Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 859 (bank contended "that plaintiffs' claims were dismissible
for failure to prove that under Vietnamese law they were entitled to recover.").
[10] 12 C.F.R. § 204.8(c) (1985). Such deposits include deposits of funds to the credit of
foreign branches where the funds are for use outside the U.S. Id. § 204.8(a)(2)(ii).
[111 Id. § 204.8(c).
[12] See, e.g., Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 470, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
[13] See, e.g., Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 860 (Chase claimed that, under New York choice of law
rules, claim concerning Vietnamese branch would be governed by Vietnamese law).
[14] See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430-31 (1964).
[15] N.Y. Banking Law § 138 (McKinney 1984).
[16] Id.
[17] Garcia,735 F.2d at 651.
[18] See infra text accompanying notes 45-96.
[19] The classic definition of the act of state doctrine is one of judicial abstention, in which
"the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory". Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
[20] See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398.
[21] Codified in U.S. law by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1982).
[22] Id. § 1604.
[23] See, eg., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill, 168 U.S. at 250.
The result is dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. The doctrine does the service, in the suit between
the private parties, that the rule of foreign sovereign immunity would perform when the state is
defending.
[24] 376 U.S. at 398.
[25] Id. at 427-28.
[26] The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws applies a "most significant relationship"
test to determine which law should govern the rights and liabilities of the parties. See Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145(1), 188(1) (1971) (directing the reader to § 6). In tort actions,
factors relevant to this determination include the place where the injury occurred and the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred. Id. § 145(2)(a),(b). In contract actions, relevant
factors include the place of contracting, the place of negotiating, the place of performance, and
the location of the subject matter of the contract. Id. § 188(2)(a),(b),(c),(d). In cases involving the
validity of an act of a foreign state, that state's own law may have the most significant relationship
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to the transaction at issue. For a critical examination of the Restatement and other current
conflicts of laws approaches, see Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 Am.
J. Comp. L. 1 (1984); Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 Mercer L.
Rev. 501 (1982-83).
(27] See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied.
392 U.S. 1027 (1966).
[28] See id.
(29] Id.
[30] 376 U.S. at 428.
[31] 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982). The Hickenlooper Amendment states that U.S. courts may
not, on the ground of the act of state doctrine, decline to decide claims of compensation for taking
of property by a foreign state in violation of international law.
[32] Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970) (Hickenlooper
Amendment does not allow U.S. bank to claim foreign state's deposits in compensation for
expropriation of bank's property).
[33] Broadly stated, the act of state doctrine will not be applied when, in the particular case.
the executive states expressly that it is its policy to relieve the court from any restraint upon the
exercise of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the foreign state's acts. Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per
curiam). The plurality in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972)
adopted the Bernstein exception, but six justices rejected it, 406 U.S. at 773 (Douglas, J..
concurring); id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 790-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun, J.J.).
A commercial activity exception, under which commercial acts of a state will not be subject to
the act of state doctrine, was applied by a plurality of the Court in Alfred Dunhill. Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
[34] Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
[35] 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 1027 (1966).
[36] Id. at 51.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[421 See Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 402(2) (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1985).
[43] See, e.g., Tabacalara Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.
1968) (credit owed to Cuban corporation by an American creditor not within Cuban territory).
[44] See, e.g., Garcia,735 F.2d at 645; Perez. 61 N.Y.2d at 460, 463 N.E.2d at 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d
at 689.
[45] 61 N.Y.2d at 460, 463 N.E.2d at 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
[46] 735 F.2d at 645.
[47] See infra text accompanying notes 51-52, 61-65.
[48] Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
[49] Id. at 467, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
[50] Id. at 467, 463 N.E.2d at 7, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
[51] Id. at 471, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
[52] Id.at 468, 463 N.E.2d at 7, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
[53] Manas y Pineiro v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 106 Misc. 2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1980).
[54] 106 Misc. 2d at 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
[55] Id.(emphasis added).
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[561 Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 A.D.2d 402, 409, 463 N.Y.S.2d 764, 768 (1983).
[57] 61 N.Y.2d at 470, 463 NE.2d at 8, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
[58] Id. at 471, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693. To complete the confusion caused by
defining the problem as one of situs, the dissenting judge in Perez argued that a deposit payable
at any branch "should not be deemed to have its situs in every country in which the bank may
have a branch office, so that the debt may be extinguished by any government which decides to
confiscate the account 'located' within its borders". Id. at 474-75, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474
N.Y.S.2d at 695 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
[59] Id. at 466-67, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
[60] 735 F.2d at 645.
[61] Id. at 650.
[62] Id.
[63] Id. at 646.
[64] Id. at 647.
[65] Id. at 646.
[66] Id. at 649.
[67] See id. at 649.
[68] Id. at 650.
[691 Id.
[70] Id.
[71] Id. at 646.
[72] Id. at 651.
[73] Id. at 653 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
[74] 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
[75] Id. at 856. The corporations maintained demand deposit accounts in local currency; the
individual's certificate of deposit was denominated in local currency.
[76] Id. at 857.
177] Id. (quoting communiqu6 of new Vietnamese government, May 1, 1975).
[78] Id.
[791 Id.
[80] Id. at 859, 863. For a discussion of the doctrine of impossibility, see Housing Auth. v.
East Tenn. Light & Power Co., 183 Va. 64, 71-72, 31 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1944); see also 18 S.
Williston & W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 58 (3d ed. 1978) (unanticipated circumstance
makes performance vitally different from that contemplated by the parties); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 26 (1979) (party's duty to perform on contract is discharged where performance
made impracticable without his fault).
[81] Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 859, 863. For a discussion of force majeure, see A. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 1324 (1962) ("catchword" used to discharge promisor from performance, serving
no useful purpose as a test of resporsibility).
[82] Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 862.
183] N.Y. Banking Law § 138 (McKinney 1984).
[84] Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 865. Because neither party invoked Vietnamese law to define Chase's
obligation, the court applied New York law to that question and Vietnamese law (as invoked by
the bank) to the question of defenses.
[851 Id.
[861 Id. at 863-64.
[87] See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
[88] Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 863.
[891 Id.
[901 Id. at 862.
[91] Id., quoting Heininger, supra note 6, at 975.
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[92] Id. at 862-63.
[93] Id. at 857.
[94] Chase's defense, based on New York's banking law which limits home office liability for
deposits in overseas branches, N.Y. Banking Law § 138 (McKinney 1984), was held applicable
only to state banks, not national banks such as Chase. Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 865. That answer
cannot be so easily given today, since New York has recently amended the banking law to apply
to national banks. The amendment became effective Aug. 1. 1984.
[95] See supra text accompanying note 92.
[96] See supra text accompanying note 59.
[97] No. 84 Civ. 0996 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1985).
[981 See id. at 2-3.
[99] Id.at 2.
[1001 Id.
[101] Id. at 8.
[102] MAAB No. 47, Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks (Oct. 1983) provides:
Any remittance of foreign exchange for repayment of principal on all foreign
obligations due to foreign banks and/or financial institutions, irrespective of
maturity, shall be submitted to the Central Bank through the Management of
External Debt and Investment Accounts Department (MEDIAD) for prior approval.
Accordingly, total obligations to foreign banks/financial institutions as of the end
of business hours in New York City on October 14, 1983 shall not be reduced
without prior Central Bank approval.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2-3, Wells
Fargo.
[103] Wells Fargo, at 10-1l.
[104] Id. at 10.
[105] Id.at 2-3, 10.
[106] Id. at 18.
[1071 Id. at 8.
[108] Id.
[109] Id. at 9.
[110] Id.
[1111 See id. at 3, 13.
[112] Id. at 12-13. "Eurodollar deposits are time deposits, denominated in U.S. dollars, in a
bank or branch located outside ... of the United States." Dufey & Giddy, supra note 6. at 567.
[113] See Wells Fargo, at 7.
[114] Id. at 14.
[115] Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment at 22 [hereinafter cited
as Wells Fargo Oral Argument].
[116] Wells Fargo, at 4.
[1171 Id. at 12-13.
[1181 Id.
[119] Id. at 2-3, 12-13.
[120] Wells Fargo Oral Argument, at 51.
[121] Wells Fargo. at 5-6, 16.
[122] Id. at 6.
[123] Id. at 16.
[124] Id. at 16-17.
[125] Id. at 12-13.
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11261 In a footnote to the opinion, the court noted that Wells Fargo had pointed out that
interest rates in other foreign cities were the same as those in Manila and thus the Manila rate,
arguably, did not reflect an assumed risk of doing business in a risky country. Id. at 19 n.2.
[1271 Id. at 5-7.
[128] N.Y. Banking Law § 138 (1) (McKinney 1984).
[129] Id.
[130] Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at
34, Wells Fargo.
[131] N.Y. Banking Law § 138 (MeKinney 1984).
[1321 Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 460, 463 N.E.2d at 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 689; see text accompanying
notes 51-58.
[133] It is interesting to speculate on the statute's applicability if the act of state doctrine is
overruled or revised by the Supreme Court. The doctrine is a matter of federal law and imposes an
obligation on courts to apply foreign law rather than local, non-federal public policy. If the
Supreme Court were to jettison the doctrine, for example, the effect would be to allow state courts
in the United States to follow their own notions of the conflict of laws. State courts could then
freely apply foreign law, following Section 138, or apply their own conceptions of public policy to
refuse to apply foreign law. I think that a search for public policy would lead the court inevitably
to Section 138 which states a policy that the home office should be liable only to the extent that a
foreign bank would be liable.
[134] Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985),
rev'g 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second Circuit's first opinion was published in the
advance sheets but later withdrawn and vacated, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, U.S. App. file).
[135] 757 F.2d at 518-19; see also 566 F. Supp. at 1442.
[136] 566 F. Supp. at 1442.
1137] Id.
[138] Id.; see also 757 F.2d at 519 (Costa Rican government "issued an executive decree which
conditioned all payments of external debt on express approval from Central Bank".).
[139] Allied Bank, vacated opinion, 733 F.2d at 24-25.
[140] 566 F. Supp. at 1442.
[141] Id. at 1443-44.
[142] 757 F.2d at 519; 566 F. Supp. at 1443-44.
1143] 757 F.2d at 519.
[144] Id.
[145] Allied Bank, vacated opinion, 733 F.2d at 26.
[146] Id.
[147] Id.
[148] Id. (quoting Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 51).
[149] Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 519.
[150] Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
[1511 Id.
[1521 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982).
[153] Id.
[154] Allied Bank, vacated opinion, 733 F.2d at 26.
[155] Id. at 26-27.
[156] Id. at 25; 757 F.2d at 520.
[157] Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 47.
[158] Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 520.
[1591 Id.
1160] Id. at 519.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol8/iss2/1

N. Leech / International banking
[1611
[1621
[1631
[164]
[165]
[166]
[1671
[168]
[1691
[170]
[1711
[172]
[1731
[174]
[175]
[176
[1771
[1781
[179]

Id.
Id.
Id. at 520.
See id. at 522.
Id. at 521, quoting Tabacalera, 392 F.2d at 715-16.
Allied bank, 757 F.2d at 521-22.
Id.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id. at 520-21.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id., quoting Tabacalera,392 F.2d at 715.
Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

147

